An interview with the Director of the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine, Ye. I. Golovakha, for the online blog “Granite of Science”

The authoritative Latvian online blog “Granite of Science” — a weekly publication about Ukrainian and world science — has published on YouTube an interview with the Director of the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Corresponding Member of the NAS of Ukraine Yevhen Golovakha. Answering the publication's first question, the head of Ukrainian sociology characterised its state in the context of world processes and of the war the Russian Federation has been waging against Ukraine since 2014 and especially since February 2022, noting: “And although the war in Ukraine is not a unique historical phenomenon, it is the most important event, one that is leading to a reconsideration of the foundations of social interaction at the global, regional and local levels.”

At the same time the sociologist did not forget psychology in his answers: “A problem that seems to me personally very important is the relationship between the personal and the institutional. All global processes depend on which personality becomes the leader in a given situation.”

The Latvian colleagues were interested in the unique Ukrainian monitoring survey that the researchers of the Institute of Sociology have been carrying out for many years now. Its results over the past two years the professor called radical changes, even upheavals: “What we obtained in 2022, compared with what there was as recently as 2021, is simply fantastic social change, which frankly speaking was hard to expect. Probably only an event such as war could radically change the situation in society on several parameters.”

The first and most important of these changes is the choice of a path of development. Instead of the path of post-Soviet reintegration, which predominated in Ukrainians' attitudes until 2014, by 2022 about 90% of Ukraine's citizens were oriented towards the EU and only a handful of per cent towards post-Soviet reintegration.

The second point is the erasure of regional and social-political differences. The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology regularly conducts research using the scale of the American sociologist Emory Bogardus (adapted by N. Panina) to measure social distance. And whereas Russians were once unquestionably the closest, now there is simply no people more distant for Ukrainians. And this is so in all regions, the sociologist stressed. The same applies to NATO — in eastern Ukraine more than two thirds are now ready to join NATO. Moreover, people have come to acknowledge unreservedly that Ukrainian should become the dominant language of communication. Contemplating people's misfortunes and suffering, many now want to give up everything connected with Russia. And this has become a nationwide mood. It is what is becoming the basis of consolidation.

The third point is that institutional trust has grown substantially. In 2013 our institute published the book “A society without trust”. This used to be a great problem for us. Before the war Ukrainian society was a society without institutional trust. Our citizens did not trust their country's main political institutions. And without that the consolidation of society is impossible. Institutional trust has now risen substantially. The highest level of trust, moreover, is in the army and in civic and volunteer organisations.”

Answering a question about the transformation of Ukrainian society, the scholar explained: “I developed my conception of social transformations between 2000 and 2010. The last review article was in 2015. The idea is this: there are several types of transformation.

Historically we see that the process of transformation in Europe proceeded constantly and unchangingly in one direction. That was a natural transformation, conditioned by the gradual formation of a free economy and democratic political institutions.

There is a reverse natural transformation. Czechoslovakia, for instance, was democratic when Germany occupied it; then it was effectively seized by the USSR, and after the USSR's collapse Czechia was able to return to the path of democratic transformation.

There is a type of voluntarist transformation. We see this in the example of some Asian states.

Ukraine, however, is a distinctive case of enforced transformation. Ukraine had no substantial preconditions for transformation before the collapse of the Soviet Union. As part of the USSR it had no institutional grounds for it. Yes, there were several hundred intellectuals ready to build democracy. But out of what and on what? I would also note that there was a serious institutional reserve in the shadow economy.

The conception of the Hungarian researchers Bálint Magyar and Bálint Madlovics is interesting; they argue that post-Soviet states build either liberal democracy (like the Baltic states) or patronal autocracy (like Russia and Belarus). But there is also the case of Ukraine — the building of a patronal democracy. It became possible because there are rich people (oligarchs) who create particular political parties, forces and organisations, and by competing they create a kind of democratic space. But there was no institutional trust. Institutional trust is the basis of what we consider a normal transformation of society. That is why I defined the Ukrainian transformation as spontaneous. We had a spontaneous transformation with a constantly postponed democratic transit. Meanwhile a very important institutional reserve was forming in the shape of socially active people ready to become actively involved in public life. It was the war that switched them into that life. And it is this institutional reserve that can secure the success of Ukraine's modernisation and full European integration.

This reserve became the basis of the new stage of transformation we are now living through, with the appearance of substantial institutional trust. Despite the fact that trust in the president has fallen compared with 2022 (it stands at about two thirds of the population), it still remains the highest figure in the whole history of our monitoring. Previously not even half the population trusted the head of their state. Before 2014 we rated Putin higher than our own president. One might even say he was the most popular politician in Ukraine. So, assessing things overall, our readiness for a real democratic transit is now, paradoxical as it may seem, far higher than it was before the war.

In my article back in 2015 I noted that for an enforced social transformation we lack three factors:

1. The creation of fundamentally new “lifts” for advancing competent managers and new politicians into responsible state positions.

2. Fostering the development of a middle class as the key social base for a successful transformation, which requires the maximum simplification of the regulation of small and medium-sized business.

3. Restoring mass trust in the state, in political institutions and in business.”

Of these three conditions, two we already observe. One condition remains — removing the artificial barriers and rules that prevent small and medium-sized business from developing and, accordingly, a middle class from forming. Today 70% of Ukrainians are confident that the country's future will be good, whereas in 2021 only 13% were, and more than a third believed things would only get worse (the rest believed nothing would change). Citizens themselves have seen their country's potential. And that matters greatly. It may become a self-fulfilling prophecy, as the outstanding American sociologist Robert Merton believed.

To the question of how the war will affect scholarship and scholars in Ukraine, the Director of the Institute replied: “As for the scholars who have left, two categories of people will return above all. The first are those who cannot find a place abroad. This concerns mainly the older generation, since young researchers adopt the Western style of work more easily. And young people will return only if jobs with a normal salary are secured for them. In this context I rate highly the role of those who went abroad — they will be able to redirect Western grants to Ukraine. My colleague Tetiana Liubyva, for instance, went abroad before the war, found a professor in Spain who was interested in cooperating with us, and our department was able in 2020 to publish the book ‘Ukraine in Transformation' with a prestigious European publisher. Every chapter of it is indexed in Scopus and Web of Science. There are a great many such examples. And this is an important way of bringing Ukraine into the international context. I therefore believe that some of the Ukrainian scholars who settle in the West can be very useful to Ukrainian scholarship. Thanks to the cooperation of our institute's deputy director Serhii Dembitskyi with American colleagues from the university in San Diego, for example, we have been able in recent years to conduct monitoring research on problems of democracy under war conditions. International cooperation, the scholar stressed, is probably the main vector of effort by which the existence of Ukrainian scholarship can be sustained.

I would note separately, the sociologist forecast, that one more category of people will return — those who cannot live outside their homeland. I believe that about half of those who left will return to Ukraine for precisely that reason!”

In closing the interview, the publication asked the Ukrainian scholar to offer a short parting word to young researchers, or to those only considering setting out on the path of scholarship.

Golovakha replied: “I would put it this way. What are all these sacrifices for now, what is Ukraine fighting for? It is undoubtedly fighting for freedom, for the possibility of self-realisation as an independent state. It is clear that in a dependent condition self-realisation will not work. Well, of all kinds of human activity it is scholarship that offers the greatest possibility of achieving freedom and independence in self-realisation. A person is truly free only in the world of abstract knowledge and can realise themselves without limit in grasping the truth. I am guided by these principles. I chose scholarship and I can say that the 50 years of my research career have not disappointed me.”

“Wonderful words!” said Anastasiia Huzhva, the publication's editor-in-chief, in conclusion. “Many thanks to you for the interview!”

We would note that this deep and extensive interview with a leading Ukrainian scholar for an authoritative publication, distributed on YouTube, will allow everyone interested in Ukrainian scholarship and in the state of Ukrainian society to obtain important and timely information.

The full interview is here