A sociologist on the indomitability of Ukrainians and on the present day
The outlet Telegraf has published, in two parts, an extensive interview with the Director of the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine, Corresponding Member of the NAS of Ukraine, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor Yevhen Golovakha.
To the first question — whether Ukrainians' pride remains our main emotion in the third year of the war, as it was at the beginning of the full-scale invasion — the scholar confirmed that it does, although the figure has been adjusted somewhat: “Compared with 2022, when pride in their country was felt by around 80–90% and fear and sorrow by about 20%, three quarters of the population still feel pride now, but fear and sorrow have grown by 10%”, which still testifies to a great potential for resilience. Pessimism and fear about the future are less pronounced. On the whole Ukrainians look to the future mainly with hope and optimism.
As for attitudes, according to our monitoring data, in December 2022 69% were prepared to endure for as long as it takes until victory, and now it is 43%. Those prepared to endure for a certain time (but not an indefinite one) were 24%, and now 26%. Those not prepared to endure, prepared to capitulate, so to speak, were 5%, and now 14%. Yes, the number prepared to endure is falling and there is no longer the enthusiasm there was in 2022, a period I call shock euphoria. Then all the positive assessments were off the scale, despite all the catastrophes the country was living through. That was the result of shock. When a person finds themselves in an extreme situation, they find astonishing resources to get out of it and experience an emotional upsurge. Now people assess the situation quite soberly. Compared with 2022, 2024 is a year of stern realism. Even so, those prepared to endure amount to 70% in total. I would note that the dynamics of these attitudes in society can change with a single positive event, and sociologists record this. If there are positive events, our potential may grow substantially. On the whole the balance of positive and negative matters greatly here. Assessments and attitudes will depend in large part on that balance at the front.
“I would draw the following scheme,” Golovakha said: “first attitudes form among people, and on their basis situational assessments. If situational assessments do not change for a sufficiently long time, convictions begin to form. And the fact that people with an unstable system of assessments waver is normal. The overwhelming majority of the population already hold the conviction that Ukraine should join NATO and the European Union. And this is a precondition for preserving independence and freedom. Yet 30% continue to waver, so this is not an absolute majority. These people must therefore be fought for — for their consciousness, for their understanding of the situation.”
In 2022–2023 we really did have a largely volunteer army. It was society's advance detachment. But society is complex, and so mobilisation now, including the problem of draft evasion, is a problem of the civic responsibility of all those who by age and physical condition can defend the country. According to various data, 20–30% are already prepared to join the army now. That is 800,000, which is not a small number. If mobilisation is organised correctly, if it is sensible and if strong moral and material incentives are created, there should be no problems with it. The second point, and this is now an appeal to the elite, is that it must be demonstrated that this concerns you too. That this is not a war of the poor in defence of the rich but a war of everyone.
To the journalist's question “How do you assess the degree of consolidation of Ukrainian society now?” the head of the Institute replied: “Let us recall that the consolidation of Ukrainian society was a terrible problem in the first decade of independence. We had two main lines of division. Geopolitical and cultural-linguistic conceptions in the various regions were very different. That is, we had specific factors that stood in the way of stable consolidation. Now, at the level of the predominant parts of the population of the regions, we have overcome these divergences, in part thanks to the war.
So that the lines of potential division do not become salient in the future, there must be programmes of adaptation and reconciliation for people who have been through more serious stress. These include programmes for involving them in business projects, programmes for restoring housing and so on.
Among Ukrainians the dominant view is that a peace without territorial concessions is needed. There are only a handful of per cent who say we should stop where we are and give Crimea and the Donbas to Russia in order to end the war. And 80% do not allow for territorial concessions. Subsequent events will clarify the real situation and refine mass attitudes.
Ukrainian society now trusts the army, volunteers, entrepreneurs and the church most. It trusts systemic politicians and state and political institutions — the courts, the Verkhovna Rada — less. The fall in the president's rating is not dramatic but natural: recall how critically the ratings of previous presidents fell five years into their terms.
Having analysed a number of processes in the Russian Federation, the sociologist made an unexpectedly bold forecast: “I believe the existing Russian economic system will not last more than two years. We have to hold out until 2026. The collapse of the Russian economy will begin in 2026 and then they will have no time for Ukraine. It is no accident that their programme is to defeat Ukraine before 2026. Their economists understand this well. Even those who work for the authorities. That is why the goal formulated there is to end the war in 2026 with a Russian victory. And we must get through 2026 with a Ukrainian victory.”
This extensive interview with the head of Ukrainian academic sociology, who drew on the findings not only of the powerful Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine but of Ukraine's sociologists generally, showed that the country's scholars, in the difficult conditions of war, continue to keep a finger on the pulse of society and to track the course of mass attitudes, which matters for shaping an adequate domestic policy. Sociologists are indispensable partners of the state, and the state should notice, value and make effective use of that.
The full material is here:
Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine
National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. The country's leading sociology research institution, founded in 1990.