A sociologist on current affairs for Telegraf
The well-known website TELEGRAF has published an interview with the Director of the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine, Corresponding Member of the NAS of Ukraine, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor Yevhen Golovakha.
Recalling his previous interview with the same respondent and the assumptions made in it, journalist Artur Hor opened the conversation with a question: “So, are we pushing back the dates for the end of the war?” The scholar replied: “I used to think there was a certain rationality in Russia. Now I see that this is a paranoid idea of destroying Ukraine. And when the first person of a country is seized by a paranoid idea, that has a substantial effect on the whole of society. There is such a phenomenon in psychiatry: when the head of a family starts to lose their mind, it partly affects the mental state of the entire family.”
Noting that losses do not deter Russians, that death is sacralised in that society, and that the price of a human life there is determined solely by the use the state can make of it, the professor summed up: “there is a very low probability that the war will end in 2026… Yet I do not regret my earlier forecasts. A forecast, if it is positive, has great value — a self-fulfilling prophecy. If you forecast something, things may turn out the way you formulated them.”
Observing that Russians will not go out to protest against Putin over petrol queues or strikes on refineries and depots, the professor stressed: “We can only count on putting a substantial part of the infrastructure out of action, so that the Russian economy can no longer withstand it.”
Recalling that in 2023–2025 sociologists often said that Ukrainian society had no split but did have dividing lines, the journalist asked: “In 2026 confrontations with the military enlistment offices have escalated considerably and have at times become widespread. Does this already look like a threatening split?”
Ukraine's leading academic sociologist replied: “Fortunately, there are still no splits in our society. But there are contradictions between different social groups. For instance, according to KIIS data, young people, unlike the older generation, are more prepared to stop the war on terms unfavourable to Ukraine. Young people are more advanced and more oriented towards the West. Is that a contradiction? And the older generation, who are far less oriented towards the West, do not want to give up the Donbas. That road leads nowhere… Even 30% of young people who see themselves in the Armed Forces is a great many. These are hundreds of thousands of people who regard that prospect as normal. In Europe people were asked whether they would defend their country in the army if war broke out. In Germany only 20% said yes. Here 30% of young people agree — and there are older people as well.”
Even the clashes with the enlistment office in Sykhiv, the sociologist noted, are not a sign of a threatening trend, because society condemned those events. Society is not on the side of those who attacked the enlistment office and the police. We do remember the 2025 findings, with the frightening figure that 40% of Ukrainians consider draft evasion to be nothing to be ashamed of. Even so, the prevailing atmosphere in society is morally healthy: “Yes, among young people there are more of those who would like to stop the fighting at the price of concessions, but that is not the majority of the young. It is when those in favour of resisting become a minority that the situation will turn threatening. I believe there will be no such threat next year either.”
Yevhen Golovakha recalled the conflict that arose over Fedorov's dismissal: “He is supported mainly by young people. Why? Because he embodies the interests of that generation. How do young people see him? That Fedorov brought innovation into the conduct of the war, that he relies not on the human resource that has to sit in a trench but on technology, artificial intelligence, missiles. Hence less risk for the living — and specifically for these young people. And if he has been removed, it looks as though the hopes of a generation have been let down. Now that generation carries a certain trauma: the person who embodies its interests has been removed. In that sense this does not serve Ukraine. But there is a very interesting point here. From 21 to 24 July our institute ran a survey — how do you feel about Fedorov being removed? More than 50% disapprove and only 7% approve, while the rest take a position in between. Understandably, young people disapprove of the dismissal most. But how did it affect attitudes towards the authorities overall? According to our survey, Ukrainians rate the authorities at 4.2 points on a scale from 0 to 10. That is below the midpoint, but far higher than any government was rated before the war. The authorities only ever scored higher immediately after elections, and for a government several years in, 4.2 points is a striking result and a very good indicator. And between those who support Fedorov's dismissal and those who do not there is practically no difference in support for the authorities. That is a phenomenon.”
Unpacking that phenomenon, the scholar stressed: “It is not so easy to knock out the foundations of vertical solidarity, as I call it — that is, the wish to hold together in hard times and rally around the centre. For a war that is normal. But reverse vertical solidarity has to show itself too. And it did show itself when Syrskyi was removed at people's demand. Here the authorities displayed reverse vertical solidarity. I understand that it would now be very hard to bring Fedorov back as minister of defence. But it would be an incredibly powerful act of solidarity. And solidarity is the decisive factor that can hold a society together. We will hold on as long as we sustain solidarity in society and keep track of which social groups potential lines of division are emerging between. All a responsible government has to do is sustain that solidarity.”
To the journalist's view that people came out not for Fedorov, not against Syrskyi and not even for new methods of waging war, but that this was a protest of exhaustion, a demand that the war end sooner, the professor responded: “I agree. But you cannot imagine how much the atmosphere in society has improved since the end of 2025. From 2022 to 2024 the mood gradually worsened. In mid-2025 that trend halted, and in December 2025 the mood went down again. Then in the first half of 2026 the atmosphere improved. Hope appeared. People felt that with people like Fedorov — figuratively speaking, with representatives of the new generation — we can stop this war.”
To the journalist's retort — “But that is self-deception. Are we really waiting once again for a ‘wizard' who will come and stop the war?” — the scholar smiled: “Do you think Ukrainians are somehow different from other nations and peoples? Everyone believes in ‘wizards', everyone expects someone to come and save them. The image of the messiah has not gone anywhere in a thousand years. Seventy per cent of believers believe in a messiah of ancient times, so why do you think they will not believe in a present-day one? The war and the hard trials that have befallen our people have forced society to grow up, yet people believe in a messiah — not necessarily in the sacred sense — and hope that newly appointed people will be more effective.”
Yevhen Golovakha illustrated his points with the examples of Zelenskyi, Zaluzhnyi, Drapatyi, Fedorov and Usyk, each of whom in his own time and his own way awakened hope in people: “When people acquire hope, they acquire optimism and do not want to leave Ukraine. It is an emotional state. Such hard trials make people more emotional, and the rational component becomes less influential. Rationality has to be preserved by those who govern the state. They must not give in to emotion.”
In 2024 Yevhen Golovakha named pride as the dominant emotion; today he identifies it as hope: “And people must not be deprived of hope, because that is a very dangerous prospect.”
The scholar cited the following figure: “Ukrainians currently rate Ukraine's economy at 4.1 out of 10. That is below the midpoint. But before the war they rated it at 2.4, even though we have lost 30% of it compared with that period. We earned the world's help through our resistance! Plus pride was added. Before the war 71% saw no prospects for Ukraine at all, whereas now the overwhelming majority believe that in ten years Ukraine will be a good European country and people will live well here. In 2021 only 17% thought so. Our losses are of course enormous, but there are also serious gains in terms of psychology and people's solidarity. There is more hope. That is, there is more of everything that defines a good future for a state. All we need is to win and not to lose the support of our friends in the EU. That will give us not only an emotional prospect but concrete material benefits.
— To the journalist's closing question, “So we will come out of the war better?”, the scholar answered firmly: “We are already better!”
The interview with the leader of academic sociology showed that the researchers of the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine, like all the country's social scientists, keep a confident finger on the pulse of social and political processes and are ready to provide research-based recommendations for well-founded state decisions.
Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine
National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. The country's leading sociology research institution, founded in 1990.