Yevhen Golovakha presents the monitoring results to NV magazine

The well-known Ukrainian magazine NV has interviewed Corresponding Member of the NAS of Ukraine, Doctor of Sociological Sciences Yevhen Golovakha, presenting him not only as Director of the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine but as the country's most authoritative sociologist (even though he does not call himself that, always paying tribute to his authoritative colleagues).

The journalist Olha Dukhnych formulated what interested her editors above all: are Ukrainians ready today for a long war, what do they think about victory and why are they drawn to nationalism? Informing readers that the Director of the Institute bases his conclusions on an unprecedented annual monitoring survey which for 30 years running has measured the state and attitudes of Ukrainian society and which Yevhen Golovakha began three decades ago together with the outstanding Ukrainian sociologist Natalia Panina, the journalist called this project the life's work of the head of Ukraine's academic sociologists and noted that the Director has now handed the continuation of this study over to his students and associates.

The journalist drew attention to the caveat with which the scholar opened the conversation: “Society is becoming more cautious in its assessments. Social desirability in respondents' answers has grown a great deal over the past year, especially where telephone interviews are concerned. Even I, as a sociologist, have to think before speaking: how to formulate a question, how to publish what might harm the country. People too begin to think about whether something can be said and whether it needs to be said in a particular situation. Panic-inducing sentiments, for instance, are something people try not to allow, so as not to encourage mass panic. Yet at the same time people are not afraid to express their views on other spheres — politics, religion, society — more than they were before the war. We have something to compare the current figures with. In November 2021, 47% of respondents believed they could express their views freely and 32% that they could not. In 2024 these figures are: 48% of respondents believe they can express their opinion freely, 27% that they cannot.

The journalist was interested in the tendency for respondents' assessments of the state's effectiveness to decline. The sociologist noted: “Before the war the assessment of the state in Ukraine could be called sternly realistic. In 2022, however, we could observe euphoria; it grew especially during the period of our successes at the front, when the effectiveness of the state was unexpectedly rated very highly, at 53.7% in May 2022. I call 2022 a period of unrealistic optimism and of that first shock enthusiasm. There were no problems with mobilisation then; volunteers queued up. People even began to rate the economic situation in the country higher than in 2021, although by then 30% of the economy had already been destroyed. So these figures were not about the economy or the state but about a general national upsurge. And it really was an upsurge; it was an accelerated formation of a political nation. And it was the year when people saw how much respect for Ukraine had risen in the world and, accordingly, their own self-respect. Hence all the assessments became more optimistic. The year 2023, I would say, was a year of moderate optimism. Optimism still remained. Assessments of the state were higher than in 2021, but it was already a moderate optimism. And in 2024 they return once more to stern realism. Some 32.9% of respondents believe the central authorities are not coping with their duties, 42.8% that they are coping only partly, and those who believe the state is coping with its duties amount to only 7%. That is already very close to the figures of the pre-war year of 2021.”

To the editors' question — what, then, is the social contract between the state and the citizen in such conditions? — the scholar answered carefully: “I think this contract still looks normal, but it is far more realistic and pragmatic. People have given the state their marks, and its representatives should study and think them over very carefully. People do not want to break their contract — ‘we give you the chance to run the country, and you must be effective'. That contract still holds. It is another matter that criticism is now built into it, and that is what sociologists are recording.”

The journalist asked about the dynamics of differences between regions, and the sociologist assured her: “These differences are not growing. Do you see? In absolute terms they grow, but in relative terms they do not. If, for instance, the number of people who believe in victory falls, it falls in a coordinated, parallel way across all regions. Fundamental regional differences have not revived, and that is very important. That is, we have ‘glued together' as a society, and what unites us is above all the following factors: first place — faith in a better future for Ukraine, 53%. Second place — the feeling of having lost a normal life, 40%. Third — patriotic feelings, 38%; fourth — shared difficulties of life, 35%; fifth — the national idea of building an independent state, 35%. That is what unites. And now look at what used to divide — different language and different political views. Now language was named as something that unites by 24% of respondents, and political views unite 6% of respondents. That is, the factors that used to divide no longer have such significance either for uniting or for dividing.”

On the influential social groups in Ukrainian society, the sociologist stressed: “Respondents name entrepreneurs as the most influential group in Ukrainian society, at 55%, the military at 54%, and workers and specialists at 51%; whereas the mafia, which Ukrainians in 2012 named as the most influential, is now considered so by only 13% of Ukrainians, and this shows how much we have changed as a society. Incidentally, only 21% of respondents consider politicians influential, whereas in 2021 there were 30%.”

In ideological terms, the analyst noted, the main tendency is that Ukrainians, like the whole of Europe, are moving to the right. Compare: the year 2012. Do you know how many nationalists we had? Two per cent. And national democrats, 7%. Communists and socialists, 20% — the left predominated among us. Liberals were 1%. By 2021 the situation had already changed. Communists and socialists were down to 13%, liberals had risen to 3%, nationalists to 3% and national democrats to 10%. So together the right came to 13 and the left to 13. And in 2024, 26% consider themselves national democrats, nationalists are already 18%, liberals 10% and communists and socialists 2%. We see a clear and consistent rightward shift among Ukrainians, caused understandably by the war and before that by the Maidan, but on the whole it fits within pan-European processes.

The scholar stressed that Ukrainians feel the existential threat keenly: “We asked what people in your circle fear most now. Dangers connected with the war — 82%. That is the main fear. Only in second place is rising prices — 59%; 45% of respondents fear non-payment of wages and pensions. Notably, 32% of Ukrainians fear hunger, and in 2021 there were 33%; the war does not affect this fear, which most likely reaches back to the cultural experience of the Holodomor. An important figure for me, though, is that 51% of Ukrainians fear the disintegration of the Ukrainian state, whereas in 2021 there were only 21%; so this fear is salient and it too is about the value of the state. Interestingly, fear of foreigners is also declining. An influx of refugees, migrants and displaced people was feared by 14% of Ukrainians, and now by only 6%.”

To the editors' question “Are people in Ukraine ready to go on enduring the difficulties of the war?” the professor replied: “We asked this question in the first year of the war, in December 2022, and then 69% of Ukrainians were ready to endure for as long as it takes. I said: you see how strong our psychology is, what endurance, what stubbornness. For as long as it takes. That is, even a hundred years. And now only 43% answered this question positively. That is, we no longer have an absolute majority, we are not set up for a war of unlimited length, and this has to be thought about; a specific date for its end has to be visible. I think the authorities must understand this. Ready to endure but for a limited time are 26% of respondents in Ukraine — so the same 69% are ready to endure. But no longer for as long as it takes; for them it matters to see a horizon to the war. It seems to me these are very important data for understanding that morale must be maintained. People must be given explanations. More must be said about the fact that we shall not leave them in a situation of war for ever. Those not ready to endure at all were 5% of respondents in December 2022 and are now 14%. So 9% have run out of patience — that is not a small number, but not a fundamental one. A large group of indeterminacy has appeared, however: 17% of respondents find it hard to answer this question, as they do about when the war will end (60% of respondents chose the option ‘hard to say').”

To the journalist's question “How might the portrait of society in the third year of the war be characterised overall?” the leader of Ukraine's academic sociologists summed up: “Stern realism. That is, Ukrainians no longer believe the war can be ended quickly. What remains is the value of Ukraine as their own independent state; the linguistic and cultural factor is now decisive for what will happen in the cultural life of Ukrainian society — 80% of respondents, regardless of whether they speak Russian or Ukrainian, want to see a single official state language in Ukraine, Ukrainian; a Ukrainian linguistic and cultural dominant has taken shape in society, yet this society is tolerant of other cultures. This is a society that is more critical of the authorities and of the political situation than it was at the beginning of the war. It is a very resilient society, though it is worth noting that a certain segment of people in a state of indeterminacy is nevertheless appearing in it. And a great deal will depend on which way their conceptions and emotions lean. Objective events matter, but what this dialogue with the indeterminate members of society will be like matters very much. That depends above all on the authorities and on representatives of the elite, on public speakers and, of course, on the media.”

The full material is here: https://nv.ua/ukraine/politics/evgeniy-golovaha-sociologicheskiy-monitoring-ukrainy-v-tretiy-god-voyny-50437905.html